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ANTITRUST AND REGULATING BIG DATA
D. Daniel Sokol* & Roisin Comerford**

INTRODUCTION
The collection of user data online has seen enormous growth in recent
years. Consumers have benefitted from this growth through an increase in
free or heavily subsidized services, better quality offerings, and rapid innovation. At the same time, the debate about Big Data, and what it really
means for consumers and competition, has grown louder. Many have focused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether
and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied
under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat
lagged behind the policy debate, and a closer inspection of existing scholarly works reveals a dearth of thorough study of the issue. Commentators
generally are split into two camps: one in favor of more proactive antitrust
enforcement in the Big Data realm, and one opposing such intervention,
considering antitrust inappropriate for regulation of Big Data. The academic
case for the former has not, as yet, been fully developed, and is relatively
light at present. Meanwhile, policy-focused work by academics and practitioners in this arena suggests that antitrust intervention in Big Data would
be premature and misguided, especially considering the myriad procompetitive benefits offered by Big Data.
This article reviews the scholarly work on the implications of Big Data
on competition, and considers the potential role of antitrust in the regulation
of Big Data. Part I provides an overview of the scarce, academic literature
specifically addressing the role of antitrust in Big Data issues. Parts II and
III delve into the policy issues surrounding Big Data and whether it poses a
risk to competition that warrants antitrust intervention. Part II details the
ways in which Big Data may prove pro-competitive while Part III reviews
and critiques the suggested potential harms to competition from Big Data.
Part IV discusses the suitability of antitrust as the institutional choice for
Big Data issues, and Part V concludes that, at present, antitrust is ill suited
as the institutional choice. Further, the scholarly case for such harm has not
*

University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of Law, University of Florida and Senior
Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.
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Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. This article was not funded by any current
or potential client. Its contents are our personal views only. This article is also based on D. Daniel Sokol
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yet been adequately established. Overall, this Article finds much noise as to
potential “problems” around whether current antitrust tools and policy are
adequate to deal with a Big Data “challenge.” In reality, there is no challenge at all, as the arguments for antitrust intervention when Big Data has
come up as an issue have never carried the day for any merger or decided
conduct case in any Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or Directorate-General for Competition
(“DG Competition”) case to date.
I.

EXISTING ACADEMIC LITERATURE

A review of the academic literature addressing the intersection of Big
Data and antitrust law reveals relatively few articles on the topic.1 Scholars
have yet to conduct an in-depth analysis of why Big Data issues are antitrust
issues, and if so, how they may be best addressed by the antitrust laws as
opposed to the consumer protection laws.2 Work to-date suggests instead
that while antitrust and consumer protection laws are complementary, they
still comprise distinct areas of law, and consumer protection remains the
correct institutional choice to address potential Big Data harms. “Big is
bad” has been a bogeyman of antitrust since the time of Standard Oil.3
However, bigness is not an antitrust offense. Rather, antitrust focuses on
consumer welfare loss and there has not been a decided merger or a litigated conduct decision that has said otherwise for at least a generation.
Arguably the most comprehensive contribution to the academic debate
on the topic of Big Data and competition is an article by Ohlhausen and
Okuliar.4 Ohlhausen and Okuliar present a three-part framework for analyzing Big Data concerns. First, they focus on the character of the harm—
1 See generally Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Advertising, in 81 ADVANCES IN
COMPUTERS, 289 (Marvin V. Zelkowitz ed., 1st ed. 2011) (providing a summary and literature review of
Big Data concerns); David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and
Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 38 (2009). Much of the scholarly work to date on two-sided online
markets traces back to work by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet &
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N, 990, 993 (2003); JeanCharles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card
Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 549 (2002). For an overview of the two sided market literature, see
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, in 1
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 407, 408–10 (Roger D. Blair & D.
Daniel Sokol, eds. 2015).
2 For an overall analysis of how economics can better explain empirics in the age of Big Data,
see Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Economics in the Age of Big Data, 346 SCIENCE 1243089, 12430891 (2014) (providing a literature review and analysis); Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2014) (analyzing the uses of big data in economics).
3 Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 439 (2012).
4 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and
The Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 123 (2015).
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whether it is commercial, personal, or otherwise.5 They conclude that where
there is harm to consumer welfare or to economic efficiency, antitrust
should prevail over consumer protection law as a matter of institutional
choice.6 Second, they examine the nature of the relationship between the
user and the data collector, and determine that issues arising from the bargain between a firm and an individual consumer are more likely to fall
within the realm of consumer protection law than antitrust.7 Third, they
consider the nature of available remedies and their presumed efficiency in
resolving particular violations.8 Ultimately, the authors advise that trying to
fit consumer protection concerns within the antitrust framework is “unnecessary,” “could lead to confusion and doctrinal issues in antitrust,” and
would not afford “true gains to consumer protection.”9 Ohlhausen and
Okuliar also note four important features of Big Data that caution against an
antitrust application over consumer protection law, which are explored in
more detail in Part IV of this article below. First, Big Data creates efficiency gains.10 Second, an antitrust institutional choice would increase subjectivity into antitrust analysis.11 Third, using antitrust would create opportunities for strategic gaming by firms of the legal system.12 Finally, Ohlhausen and Okuliar warn that using an antitrust lens may threaten innovation for new products and services.13
James Cooper echoes that antitrust law is an inappropriate tool to regulate Big Data. He writes:
The problem with contentions that antitrust laws should directly consider how conduct affects privacy, irrespective of competitive effects, can be addressed rather easily. Absent
amendment of the antitrust laws or serious departure from stare decisis, courts are unlikely to
accommodate privacy effects in an antitrust analysis . . . . Further, even if one were to accept
the analogy between enhanced personal data collection and prices (or equivalently, lower quality) at face value, there is nothing in the antitrust laws to prevent a firm from unilaterally engaging in this conduct. Antitrust’s longstanding aversion to price regulation means that a legal
14
monopolist is free to charge whatever price the market will bear.

Cooper also suggests that privacy in Big Data as an antitrust concern would
raise certain First Amendment issues, as well as muddle the goal of en-

5

Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 154.
7 Id. at 154–55.
8 Id. at 155–56.
9 Id. at 138.
10 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 151.
11 Id. at 151–52.
12 Id. at 152.
13 Id.
14 James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1133–34 (2013) (internal footnote omitted).
6
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forcement, thereby introducing unnecessary subjectivity into the analysis
and lending itself to Virginia School-styled rent seeking in antitrust.15
Andres Lerner argues that claims of Big Data presenting competitive
concerns are unsupported by real world evidence.16 In particular, Lerner
argues that in practice the oft-cited “feedback loops” do not have the strong
effects with which they are commonly credited.17 Lerner discusses the procompetitive rationales for collection and use of consumer data online, including the potential for improved services, and the ability of firms to
monetize effectively on the paid side so as to provide better services at
lower prices or for free.18 He dismisses the idea that firms’ may have the
incentive or ability to use data to entrench their dominant position (e.g.,
user data is non-rivalrous and no one firm controls a significant share of
data), citing attributes of data similar to those listed by Ohlhausen and
Okuliar.19 Lerner maintains that there is a complete lack of evidence that
online markets have “tipped” to dominant firms, due in most part to the
differentiated nature of online offerings.20 He concludes that without strong
real-world evidence of anticompetitive effects, aggressive antitrust enforcement would hamper competition and chill innovation, injuring consumer welfare in the process.21
Although policy makers have dipped their toe into the antitrust in Big
Data debate,22 antitrust agencies and the courts have not found a Big Data
competition problem. In fact, the FTC and DG Competition have thoroughly considered Big Data as an antitrust problem and completely dismissed it.23 The antitrust authorities in the United States, at DG Competition
15 Id. at 1138–44. See also Fred S. McChesney et al., Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective, in 1 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 156, 163 (Roger D.
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
16 Andres V. Lerner, The Role of “Big Data” in Online Platform Competition 4–5 (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482780.
17 Id. at 20.
18 Id. at 10–12.
19 Id. at 20–23.
20 Id. at 46–53.
21 Id. at 62.
22 See European Data Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor: Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay Between Data
Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy, at 6–7 (Mar. 2014),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2014/1403- 26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf; Debbie Feinstein, The Not-So-Big News About Big Data,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/
06/not-so-big-news-about-big-data; Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big
Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2014, at 5.
23 See Deborah Feinstein, Big Data in a Competition Environment, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May
2015, at 2; Abir Roy, European Antitrust Enforcers Move on Holders of Big Data, KLUWER
COMPETITION L. BLOG (May 26, 2016), http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2016/05/26/europeanantitrust-enforcers-move-on-holders-of-big-data/.
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and at the national level French and German Competition authorities24 and
Europe have moved cautiously so far. This forbearance is not only proper,
but also serves as a reminder that the distinct issues addressed by antitrust
and consumer protection law, and the solutions that may be applied by each
set of laws to prohibited behavior, are distinct for good reason, and are
complements, rather than substitutes.25
II.

CAN BIG DATA LEAD TO PRO-COMPETITIVE BENEFITS?

Unprecedented consumer benefits have already been realized through
the use of Big Data, chief among them free user services (as a number of
the cases have noted),26 improved quality, and a rapid increase in innovation. Furthermore, fears surrounding Big Data and its use by large online
firms are unwarranted, as the economic traits of Big Data ameliorate concerns that such data can be manipulated for anticompetitive gains.
A.

Monetization of Data Subsidizes Free Products for Consumers

Perhaps the most obvious and pervasive benefit to be realized in the
Big Data era has been the ability of firms to offer heavily subsidized, often
free, services to consumers as consumers give those firms permission to
monetize consumer data on the other side of their business.27 In a competition law regime where lower prices for consumers are deemed highly desirable, this is undoubtedly a benefit to consumers.
24

Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) and the Autorité de la concurrence (French
Competition Authority), Competition Law and Data, at 53 (May 10, 2016), http://www.bunde
skartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.pdf?__blob=publication
File&v=2 (Finding that “[a] case-specific assessment of the reality and extent of the ‘data advantage’
needs to be undertaken to bear out or reject this premise [of market power]” and that no specific real
world case has of yet been identified.).
25 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 713, 718 (1997); Timothy J. Muris & Paloma
Zepeda, The Benefits, and Potential Costs, of FTC-Style Regulation in Protecting Consumers, 8
COMPETITION L. INT’L 11, 11 (2012) (“Like peanut butter and jelly, competition and consumer protection regulation work better when combined.”).
26 See, e.g., Case T-79/12, Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 73 (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145461&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=44480; Streetmap.eu Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253
(Ch) [22] (Eng.); Case COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, 2014 O.J. (C 7239)
24-25, ¶ 90.
27 See RUSSELL WALKER, FROM BIG DATA TO BIG PROFITS: SUCCESS WITH DATA AND
ANALYTICS 141–42 (2015); Lerner, supra note 16, at 12. See also, Case COMP/M.7217—
Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 47 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that “[t]he vast majority of social
networking services are provided free of monetary charges”).
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The monetization of the data in the form of targeted advertising sales
for antitrust purposes is not suspect or harmful, but rather “economicallyrational, profit-maximizing behavior,” that results in obvious consumer
benefit.28 Were online platforms prevented or restricted from collecting and
monetizing consumer data, competition for users would be inhibited, and
harm to consumers would result, in the form of higher prices for services.29
Indeed switching costs are low regarding data and search.30
Some criticize the provision of free services, claiming that this makes
it more difficult for rivals that cannot initially monetize as effectively to
compete with established rivals,31 but cases show that this argument misses
the point completely.32 The ability to offer high-quality services to consumers for free is a procompetitive effect of Big Data monetization, not an anticompetitive harm.33 Also, the assertion is simply untrue—it is not more
difficult for new entrants to compete with established rivals in free services.34
B.

Improved Quality and Enhanced Innovation

As an input, online firms use data to improve and refine products and
services in a number of ways, and to develop brand new innovative product
offerings. For example, search engines, both general and niche, can use data
to deliver more relevant, high quality search results.35 By learning from user
search queries and clicks, search engines can identify the most relevant
results for a particular query. “Click-and-query” data, as it is known, is a
highly valuable input in delivering high quality search results.36 Outside of
just relevant results, search engines can use data to provide additional

28

Lerner, supra note 16, at 13.
Id. at 15.
30 Id. at 50; Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis:
A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 177 (2013); see also, Case
COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 73 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that data sets
should not have an impact in a market for online advertising because there are so many different sources
of user data available on the web).
31 Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J.
ON REG. 401, 427–28 (2014).
32 See, e.g., Judgment, Streetmap.eu Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch), [138]-[39]
(Eng.).
33 Lerner, supra note 16, at 17; Torsten Körber, Common Errors Regarding Search Engine Regulation —and How to Avoid Them, 36 EURO. COMPETITION L. REV. 239, 240 (2015).
34 See generally Case COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision (Mar. 10, 2014).
35 Michael A. Salinger and Robert J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation,
46 REV. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 25, 47 (2015).
36 Id.
29
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“value-added” services to users.37 For example, travel search engines can
use data to forecast price trends on flights for specific routes.38 Amazon and
multiple other e-commerce sites use past purchase information and browsing history to make personalized shopping recommendations for users.39
Social networking platforms use data collected from users to suggest
friends, celebrity or business pages, or articles that customers might be interested in.40 Online media outlets use browsing history and personal information to recommend other articles that a reader may be interested in.
C.

Economic Characteristics of Big Data Protect Against Competitive
Harm

In addition to the affirmative pro-competitive benefits of Big Data expounded above, the economics of how Big Data works, as described below,
damages claims that it should be feared or reined in by antitrust. Additionally, the unique economic characteristics of data mean that its accumulation
does not, by itself, create a barrier to entry, and does not automatically endow a firm with either the incentive or the ability to foreclose rivals, expand
or sustain its own monopoly, or harm competition in other ways.41 Lambrecht and Tucker explain that “[f]or there to be a sustainable competitive
advantage, the firm’s rivals must be unable realistically to duplicate the
benefits of [the] strategy or input.”42 As suggested below, both theory and
actual cases support a finding that the characteristics of data are such that
larger online firms cannot foreclose rivals from replicating the benefits of
Big Data they enjoy, and that Big Data in the hands of large firms does not
necessarily pose a significant antitrust risk.

37

See generally RUSSELL WALKER, FROM BIG DATA TO BIG PROFITS: SUCCESS WITH DATA AND
ANALYTICS (2015).
38 Brian Honigman, How Big Data Is Transforming The Travel Industry, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/centurylink/2014/04/30/how-big-data-is-transforming-the-travelindustry/#1d9907a5423c.
39 Mark Milian, Retailers Use Big Data to Turn You Into a Big Spender, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 4,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-03/retailers-use-big-data-to-turn-you-into-a-big-spend
er.html; see also Phil Simon, How to Get Over Your Inaction on Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2014,
https://hbr.org/2014/02/how-to-get-over-your-inaction-on-big-data-2.
40 For a detailed study extracting (sampling) and characterizing Facebook user data, see Minas
Gjoka et al., Walking in Facebook: A Case Study of Unbiased Sampling of OSNs, 29 INST. OF ELEC.
AND ELEC. ENG’RS (2010), http://www.minasgjoka.com/papers/unbiasedsampling-infocom2010.pdf.
41 See generally Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E. Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from
Competition? (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705530 (evaluating the
strategic role of big data as a source of sustainable competitive advantage).
42 Id. at 4–5.
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Low Barriers to Entry

Data driven markets are typically characterized by low entry barriers,
as evidenced by innovative challengers emerging rapidly and displacing
established firms with much greater data resources than themselves.43 While
the existence or lack thereof of barriers to entry can, and will, differ from
market to market, and a blanket determination cannot be made in the abstract, the history of the digital economy offers many examples, like Slack,
Facebook, Snapchat, and Tinder, where a simple insight into customer
needs enabled entry and rapid success despite established network effects.44
The data requirements of new competitors are far more modest and
qualitatively different than those of more established firms.45 Little, if any,
user data is required as a starting point for most online services. Instead,
firms may enter with innovative new products that skillfully address customer needs, and quickly collect data from users, which they can then use
for further product improvement and success.46 As such, new entrants are
unlikely to be at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to incumbents in terms of data collection or analysis.47
And, while a firm that has been operational for ten years may have a
larger data store than a new entrant, lack of asset equivalence has never
been a sufficient basis to define a barrier to entry in any cases as of yet.48 In
brick-and-mortar retail, a new entrant may have a smaller showroom than
an established competitor, but this does not render the need for a physical
store an insurmountable barrier to entry. Indeed, an established brick-andmortar store could have much more data on local customer preferences, but
that has never been viewed as prohibitive to entry.
2.

Data is Ubiquitous, Inexpensive, and Easy to Collect

Data is ubiquitous, inexpensive, and easy to collect.49 Users are constantly creating data, as increased internet and smartphone usage means
customers are continuously leaving behind traces of their needs and preferences.50 Firms can easily and quickly collect data from consumers upon
launch, and both data and the tools needed to store and analyze it are read43

Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 1–2.
Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 11–15.
45 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 6–9.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 Catherine Tucker, The Implications of Improved Attribution and Measurability for Antitrust and
Privacy in Online Advertising Markets, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2013).
50 See Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 6-7.
44
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ily available from numerous third party sources. Big Data has near-zero
marginal costs of production and distribution.51 Firms are able to collect
data from many different sources, demonstrating the reality that users leave
“multiple digital footprints” wherever they tread online.52 The fact that data
can, therefore, be acquired from third party sources means that even on the
first day of product launch, before any user has interacted with the platform,
a provider can already have benefitted from insights into consumer preferences and designed a platform that can act quickly as data is collected and
processed.
While some argue that the resources and effort expended by companies in pursuit of data is evidence enough that data collection and processing is both “costly” and “time-consuming,”53 it is important to distinguish
between the collection of raw data and the analysis any given firm puts the
data through, which is what makes the data valuable. This is the firm’s “secret sauce.” This analysis is also, incidentally, the part of a firm’s Big Data
usage that requires the most resources.54 There is also plenty of off-the-shelf
and open source analytics software that could give small firms a head start.
3.

Data is Non-Exclusive and Non-Rivalrous

Data is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. No one firm can, or does,
control all of the world’s data. Collection of a piece of data by one firm
does not occur at the expense of another firm. “Multi-homing” is the norm
among internet users—users can, and do, spread their data around the internet, using multiple different providers for multiple different services, or
sometimes the same service.55 While multi-homing, a user shares data with
multiple providers.56 Multi-homing also serves to reduce market power.57
Big Data has been likened to other inputs as it becomes an increasingly important asset.58 However, Big Data’s non-rivalrous and nonexclusive nature sets it apart from other key inputs. If one provider has a
piece of data, another provider is not prevented from collecting that very
same piece of data. Similarly, while one provider could at least theoretically
51

CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 24 (1999).
52 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 3.
53 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Debunking the Myths over Big Data and Antitrust, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2015, at 7.
54 John Bantleman, The Big Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/ciocentral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data/#3ecaa8286a21.
55 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra 41, at 7.
56 Id.
57 See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 669-70
(2006).
58 See Tucker & Welford, supra note 22, at 4.
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hold all of the world’s oil resources, for example, no one provider can
amass all available data. Furthermore, incumbent online providers do not
have explicit or de facto exclusivity over user data. There are no exclusivity
clauses in terms of service with users, and there are no structures (pricing or
otherwise) that lock users into sharing their data with only one provider.59
4.

Data’s Value is Short-Lived

Data has a limited lifespan—old data is not nearly as valuable as new
data—and the value of data lessens considerably over time.60 Additionally,
the returns on scale diminish over time.61 Therefore, any competitive advantage that data provides is fleeting, and entrants are unlikely to be significantly disadvantaged relative to incumbents in terms of data collection and
analysis.62 The need for fresh, differentiated data means that a holding a
large volume of stale or generalized data does not, necessarily, benefit the
holder and disadvantage a potential challenger. Potential competitors do not
need to create a data store “equivalent to the size of the incumbent”; they
rather need to devise a strategy to accumulate highly relevant and timely
data.63
5.

Data Alone is Not Enough

Data does not typically provide value on a standalone basis. Mere possession of data alone therefore, even in large volume, does not secure com59

See Andrea Renda, Searching for Harm or Harming Search? A Look at the European Commission’s Antitrust Investigation Against Google 30, (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working Paper No.
118, 2015) (“The existence of widespread multi-homing makes barriers to entry and switching even
more evanescent.”), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/AR%20Antitrust%20Investigation%20Google.
pdf.
60 Lockwood Lyon, The End of Big Data, DATABASE J. (May 16, 2016), http://www.
databasejournal.com/features/db2/the-end-of-big-data.html (“As data ages it tends to become less relevant for the following reasons: Newly implemented operational applications will not have a data history;
Older products are removed and replaced by new products; Older customers may no longer exist; As
you apply maintenance to current operational systems, some analyses of ‘old’ behavior becomes irrelevant; Older data tends to be less accurate and sometimes is missing altogether, [and] as operational
systems are adjusted to fix these problems, inaccurate or missing historical data will skew analyses.”).
61 William Terdoslavich, Big Data & The Law Of Diminishing Returns, INFORMATIONWEEK
(Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/big-data-and-the-law-ofdiminishing-returns/d/d-id/1323310.
62 See generally Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Search Engines and Data Retention: Implications for Privacy and Antitrust (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5094-14, May 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441333.
63 Nils-Peter Schepp & Achim Wambach, On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power
Assessment, 7 J. EUR. COMP. L. & PRAC. 120, 122 (2016).
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petitive success—that can only be achieved through engineering talent,
quality of service, speed of innovation, and attention to consumer needs. As
such, the firm with the most data does not necessarily win. Take the online
dating application, Tinder, initially launched in September 2012, as an example. Data is of particular value in industries where personalized experience is important, such as online dating.64 When Tinder launched, it had no
access to user data, but nevertheless it became the market leader within a
couple of years.65 Lambrecht and Tucker explain that even in this highly
data driven industry, Tinder succeeded not through reliance on Big Data,
but due to the strength of its underlying solution.66 A simple user interface
and a precise attention to consumer needs resulted in massive gains for the
new entrant. Similarly, despite facing competition from long established
incumbents with access to huge volumes of data, amassed over years of
customer service, WhatsApp was able to take on more established messaging and social networks because of its low cost and easy-to-use interface.67
Examination of these industries leads Lambrecht and Tucker to conclude
that to build a sustainable competitive advantage from Big Data, a firm
needs to focus on developing both the managerial toolkit and organizational
competence that allows them to turn Big Data into value to consumers in
previously impossible ways, rather than simply amassing tremendous
amounts of data.68
6.

Highly Differentiated Platforms Need Highly Differentiated Data

Online platforms are highly differentiated, even in the provision of the
same type of service, and as each entrant carves out a niche, the most useful
data to them differs more and more from the data most useful to their rivals.69 Consumers are moving towards meeting more precise, niche consumer needs. A consumer looking to book a flight could use Kayak, Expedia, Orbitz, or a multitude of other travel-dedicated search engines. The
same is true in internet shopping, online dating, social networking, product
and service reviews, and a host of other online markets. In today’s online
environment, successful firms must carve out their own niche, and increasingly, data that is useful (even crucial) to one firm may not be useful to its
64 See Paul Rubens, Is Big Data Dating the Key to Long-lasting Romance?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26613909.
65 Emily Witt, Love Me Tinder, GQ (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.gq.com/story/tinder-onlinedating-sex-app (“Until recently, hookup apps were straightforward but sleazy. Then along came Tinder,
the dating-hookup hybrid that made things simpler, sexier, and particularly lady-friendly. In just fifteen
months, it seems to have cracked the code and caught fire.”).
66 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 14.
67 Id. at 12.
68 Id. at 16.
69 See Schepp & Wambach, supra note 63, at 122.
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competitors.70 An astute and innovative entrant will identify a niche where
the incumbent does not have requisite data, and can very quickly “catch up”
to the incumbent in terms of valuable data amassed.
III. DOES BIG DATA POSE HARM TO COMPETITION?
Although data as a potential antitrust concern is not a particularly new
issue, what has changed dramatically in recent years is the size and scope of
the data that firms collect, store, and use. As Deborah Feinstein, head of the
FTC’s Bureau of Competition put it, “What is new is the explosion in the
collection and use of data about consumers, from their shopping habits to
their sensitive health information.”71 With the growth in the amount of data
and the advent of Big Data, the importance of that data as an input in online
platforms has also increased. The growing importance of Big Data as an
input, and the consistent increase in the 4 Vs of data—volume, velocity,
variety, and value72—means that companies are now more than ever undertaking data-driven strategies to gain operational efficiencies,73 and, some
argue, to gain and sustain an unfair competitive advantage.74
This section describes a number of ways in which some have argued
that firms can use Big Data to perpetuate an unfair competitive advantage
and consequently distort competition and harm consumers. These commentators argue that Big Data arms online providers with the incentive and ability to erect barriers to entry and maintain dominance by “limit[ing] their
competitors’ access to data, prevent[ing] others from sharing the data, and
oppos[ing] data-portability policies that threaten data-related competitive
advantages.”75 The resulting harm, according to such critics, is “not necessarily higher price[s]” (considering most of these services are provided for
free), but rather a “loss of quality, innovation, and privacy.”76
70

See id.
Feinstein, supra note 22.
72 Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in
the Era of Big Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2015, at 2 n.13 (quoting ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL, GROWTH AND
INNOVATION 12 (2013) (“Value is a fourth V which is related to the increasing socioeconomic value to
be obtained from the use of big data. It is the potential economic and social value that ultimately motivates the accumulation, processing and use of data.”)); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG
DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“Most definitions [of “big data”] reflect
the growing technological ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, velocity,
and variety of data.”).
73 See Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 12.
74 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 2.
75 Id.; see also Newman, supra note 31, at 403.
76 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen Grunes, Dancing Around Data, THE HILL: CONG. BLOG. (Dec. 10,
2014, 11.30 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/226502-dancing-around-data.
71
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To properly assess the antitrust implications of Big Data, we must understand fully the ways in which online platforms use Big Data and the
nature of competition among them. A crucial starting point in this endeavor
is a solid understanding of two-sided platforms. A two-sided platform exists
when one provider caters to two different customers groups on different
sides of the same platform.77 For example, social media platforms give users free access to social networking services on one side of the platform and
rely on the provision of advertising services to businesses on the other side
of the platform for revenue.78 A proper antitrust assessment of any twosided platform must take into account competition on each side of the platform.79 It is important to recognize that certain actions may cause procompetitive effects for the platform as a whole, while initially appearing anticompetitive on one side of the platform. A comprehensive antitrust analysis cannot look at one side of the platform in a vacuum—it must weigh the
benefits and harm to the platform as a whole.80
A.

Loss of Quality and Innovation

While firms with access to troves of Big Data can use it to improve the
quality of their products in several ways, a number of practitioners have
argued that misuse of Big Data may result in a loss of quality.81 While the
exact parameters of this proposition are open to debate, scale in data is,
indisputably, important in improving the quality of online services. Smaller
firms, the argument goes, often cannot adequately compete with larger
firms because they lack access to the same volume of data as the larger
firm. As the data gap, and consequently the quality gap, widens between the
dominant firm and a smaller rival, the competitive constraint the rival poses
to the dominant firm in terms of quality and innovation is diminished. The
77

Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 1, at 408–10.
Inge Graef, Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms, 38
WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECON. REV. 473, 476–77 (2015).
79 Note, however, that the analytical appropriateness of the two-sided market is not without debate. See Marcela Mattiuzzo, Online Advertising Platforms and Personal Data Retail: Consequences for
Antitrust Law, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2015, at 2 (“[O]ne should question whether continuing to
apply [the two-sided model] without qualification is the most suitable course forward . . . . There are
platforms that fit the two-sided model poorly and whose antitrust analysis could thus profit from a
different framework.”).
80 See Salinger & Levinson, supra note 35, at 49–50; Hemant K. Bhargava et al., The Move to
Smart Mobile and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis of Online Markets, U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 36), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2721394.
81 See Grunes & Stucke, supra note 72, at 5. But see Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Access
Barriers to Big Data (forthcoming) (manuscript at 38) (on file with author) (“In other situations, big
data advantages may increase the incentives of other firms to compete not only on the big-data-basedinformation, but on other dimensions of the product, including quality and price.”).
78
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larger firm, in this scenario, is not driven to innovate or to maximize quality
for the consumer.82
Stucke and Ezrachi argue that inequality in access to data can lead to
the potential degradation of quality for consumers in search engines in particular.83 They claim that large search engines have the incentive and ability
to prioritize paid advertising over more relevant, better quality, organic
search results.84 On a search engine, more advertisements, displayed more
prominently, benefit both the advertiser and the search provider. More ads
increase the opportunities for user clicks. This in turn means a greater likelihood of a pay-per-click conversion for the platform provider and a better
chance of a product sale for the advertiser. Where this becomes an antitrust
problem, Stucke and Ezrachi suggest, is where Big Data has widened the
gap between large and small providers to the extent that a smaller provider
cannot provide adequate quality competition to prevent its larger rival from
sacrificing some degree of search quality in favor of expanding profits on
the paid side.85 The fact that a large search engine has access to so much
data, and therefore the ability to improve search quality to such a high degree, means it can afford to sacrifice a higher level of search quality than a
smaller search engine (who is already struggling on quality due to lower
data levels) could.86 Additionally, the disparity in data volume means that
users are generally unable to detect small degradations in quality—they just
know that Google is giving a better result than Bing, but not how much better.87
In addition to the lack of real world supporting evidence, this theory of
harm also begs the question whether incremental degradation in quality by
a search provider whose quality is still superior to rivals is an antitrust concern. Does a firm have an obligation to provide the absolute best quality
product it can, even if not profit maximizing? No court or antitrust regulator
has ever imposed such a requirement. And, in this example, how does a
regulator measure the “best quality search results,” since quality is relative
and users are said to not be able to accurately assess quality?
These questions aside, this loss of quality theory also overlooks the
importance of analyzing both sides of the two-sided platform. While no ads
at all would certainly improve search quality, it would clearly be very detrimental to advertisers. Increasing ad space might be beneficial to advertisers, but could admittedly lead to search quality degradation for users. Antitrust analysis requires a balancing act and an understanding of the inherent
82

Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76.
Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at
Search Engines, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 103 (2016).
84 Id. at 91–92.
85 See id. at 96–97.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 101–02.
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tradeoffs between both sides of the platform. A holistic approach to the
economic efficiency of the conduct is required, as opposed to delegating to
antitrust the responsibility (instead of properly assigned to the market itself)
to police whether search quality dips below “levels that consumers prefer,”
as Stucke and Ezrachi claim.88
In addition to the alleged degradation in quality that can occur, Big
Data can also, some allege, stifle innovation. Where a firm’s value proposition is built on collecting and monetizing user data, if that firm collects so
much user data that it becomes entrenched, it may gain both the ability and
the incentive to use that data in a number of ways to eliminate potential
challengers.89 As this happens, smaller rivals are prevented from accessing
necessary data, and the incentive for these firms to innovate and to compete
with larger dominant firms is reduced. For example, a dominant firm with
access to Big Data could conceivably look to trends in data to identify potential challengers and devise strategies to quickly stamp out any rising
competition by limiting or preventing their access to necessary data, or by
acquiring them.90 Where market leaders with deep pockets acquire potential
or actual new entrants, a source of innovation is removed, and competition
suffers.91 Of course, such a discernment of trends may also be beneficial to
competition where it forces a market leader to further invest in innovation
itself, as antitrust law fundamentals contemplate.92 It is also worth bearing
in mind that acquiring a smaller rival is not, without proof that such acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition, prohibited under the antitrust laws. Indeed, the potential for such acquisitions incentivizes entry.93
B.

Harm to Privacy

Proponents of antitrust involvement in Big Data suggest that consumers feel they do not have control over how online platform providers use

88

Id. at 91.
Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76.
90 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 8.
91 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 6.4
(2010) (“The Agencies also consider whether a merger is likely to give the merged firm an incentive to
cease offering one of the relevant products sold by the merging parties.”).
92 Id. (“The Agencies also consider whether the merger is likely to enable innovation that would
not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary capabilities that cannot be otherwise
combined or for some other merger-specific reason.”).
93 Id. (“Competition often spurs firms to innovate. The Agencies may consider whether a merger
is likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative
efforts below the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.”)
89
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and collect their data.94 Ohlhausen and Okuliar agree that “many consumers
. . . are worried about the privacy losses associated with extensive collection and manipulation of consumer information online.”95 Some argue that
consumers continue to utilize free services provided by “internet giants”
only because they are faced with no viable alternative than to use these
services and “pay” by divulging their personal information.96 As users create more and more data, and firms continue to collect it, the safeguards protecting its collection and use may well become more important and more
vulnerable to attack. The economics literature shows that, in fact, the collection of data may provide improved services,97 product recommendations,98 or free content.99
Privacy protections can be considered a form of non-price competition, which is especially important in industries where the service itself is
offered for free.100 Firms may compete by offering tighter or more transparent privacy policies.101 Yet Jones Harbour and Koslov argue that consumers
can be harmed when a dominant firm has no incentive to invest in privacy
protections (especially where it may harm the firm’s ability to monetize on
the paid side), and its competitors are too small, or their quality too inferior,
to exert competitive pressure significant enough to discipline the dominant
firm.102 Consumers may feel they have no choice but to use the dominant
firm in order to get good quality results. Alternatively, the lack of viable
good quality alternatives may endow users with a higher “tolerance” for
weaker results. Acquisti offers a literature review that provides a more nuanced view of different ways consumers value privacy.103 His analysis

94 Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision
of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 782 (2010); Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at
6.
95 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 122.
96 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76.
97 Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase History, 24
MARKETING SCI. 367, 368 (2005).
98 James Bennett & Stan Lanning, The Netflix Prize, 2007 PROC. OF KDD CUP & WORKSHOP,
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/KDD-cup-2007/NetflixPrize-description.pdf.
99 See Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising, 57 MGMT.
SCI. 57, 61 (2011).
100 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 133 (“[P]rivacy protection has emerged as a small, but
rapidly expanding, dimension of price competition among digital platforms.”).
101 David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 37, 57 (2009); Scott J. Savage & Donald M. Waldman, Privacy Tradeoffs in Smartphone
Applications, 137 ECON. LETTERS 171, 171 (2015).
102 Harbour & Koslov, supra note 94, at 785 n. 50.
103 Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics of Privacy to the Economics of Big Data, in
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 91 (Stefan Bender et al.
eds., 2014) (“Evaluations and conclusions regarding the economic value of privacy and the optimal
balance between disclosure and protection are, therefore, far from simple.”).
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shows that issues involving privacy trade-offs are more complex than Jones
Harbour and Koslov advocate.
It is important to note however that harm to privacy does not, without
more, equal harm to competition. And, as discussed in more detail below,
antitrust is ill-equipped to solve consumer law problems. In a recent speech,
FTC Chairwoman Ramirez correctly characterized these issues as risks best
addressed by consumer protection and privacy laws:
As you can see, every step in the life cycle of big data raises the potential for significant privacy and other risks. First, despite the potential for big data’s positive impact on the lives of
consumers, there is a real risk of lack of transparency and loss of consumer control . . . . Second, there is a risk of unexpected and unwelcome use of data [such as data being used with104
out consent] . . . . Third, big data raises concerns about data security.”

The major data issues are thus not antitrust issues at all!
C.

Data-Driven Mergers and Data Driven Defenses

The number of Big Data related merger cases has increased over time.
In this context, further potential harms could, some argue, arise from datadriven mergers where the transaction rationale rests on the acquirer gaining
access to the underlying data set of the target undertaking.105 Stucke and
Grunes argue that such data driven mergers can “potentially lessen nonprice competition in terms of the array of privacy protections offered to
consumers.”106 They and others suggest that where privacy constitutes an
important dimension of competition in a given market, 107 or represents an
important element of transaction rationale, antitrust agencies should closely
examine transactions to determine whether the combination is likely to reduce incentives to compete in providing privacy protections to consumers.
An early example of this argument can be found in then-Commissioner
Harbour’s dissenting statement in the investigation of Google’s acquisition
of DoubleClick, which suggested that privacy could be “‘cognizable’ under
the antitrust laws,” and should have been considered by the Commission

104

Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Remarks at the International Conference
on Big Data from a Privacy Perspective: Protecting Privacy in the Era of Big Data (June 10, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/06/protecting-privacy-era-big-data-remarks-ftcchairwoman-edith-ramirez.
105 Graef, supra note 78, at 19-20.
106 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 5.
107 See generally Graef, supra note 78.
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“as part of its antitrust analysis of the transaction.”108 The former Commissioner’s statement cited a theory that network effects could lead to fewer
search engines, reducing “incentives of search firms to compete based on
privacy protections or related non-price dimensions.”109
These concerns have not been born out yet by any actual cases. In the
U.S., the antitrust agencies have had occasion to consider the role of Big
Data in a number high profile mergers, and merging parties have increasingly put forth data driven efficiencies in defense of mergers, with varying
degrees of success.110 For example, with respect to ratings and reviews platform provider Bazaarvoice’s 2012 acquisition of rival PowerReviews, both
the Department of Justice and the trial court rejected the parties’ efficiency
claims, citing a lack of evidence that the transaction had resulted in data
gains that lead to an improved product, lower prices, or greater innovation.111 On the other hand, during the Department of Justice’s 2010 investigation into a search-related partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo!, the
Justice Department did accept the parties’ data driven efficiency argument,
suggesting that the transaction might be pro-competitive where increased
access to data enabled more rapid improvements in Microsoft’s search offering, thereby creating a more viable competitive alternative to Google.112
In Europe, although the Commission did not ultimately opine on this
particular issue, the parties to the TomTom/TeleAtlas merger argued that
customer feedback data would allow the combined firm to produce better
digital maps at a faster pace.113 The Commission noted low switching costs
and limited pass through to consumers.114 As such, the Commission found
that there was no incentive to foreclose competitors.115 In another case, the
Commission found that the Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere
joint venture posed no Big Data problem with regard to the data analytics
services because of robust competition in the market to store data and alter108 Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement Regarding In re
Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), at 10, http://www ftc.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statementmattergoogle/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.p
df [hereinafter Harbour Dissenting Statement].
109 Id. at 10 n. 25.
110 See generally Grunes & Stucke, supra note 72, at 3. Precedential cases involving Big Data are
explored more thoroughly in Part IV below.
111 Id. (citing United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966,
at *62–64 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014)).
112 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
on its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search Advertising Agreement
Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigation-internet.
113 Case COMP/M.4854, TomTom/TeleAtlas, Comm’n Decision, 2008 O.J. (C 237) 53–54, ¶¶
245–50.
114 Id. at 22, ¶ 106 ([T]he Commission considers barriers to switching to be relatively limited.”).
115 Id. at 50, ¶ 230
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natives.116 Similarly, the Commission did not find a Big Data problem in
Publicis/Omnicom, where the Commission noted competition from alternative providers of big data analytics.117
D.

The Perceived Strength of Scale, Network Effects, and Barriers to Entry

Many, if not all, of the theories of harm attributed to Big Data rest on
the perceived strength of the “feedback loop” and the consequential network effects enjoyed by large firms with access to tremendous amounts of
data.118 Big Data can give rise to network effects, and certainly, network
effects can play a significant role in a sound antitrust analysis. However,
agencies, policy makers, and scholars must resist any foregone conclusion
that the presence of network effects in Big Data automatically results in
anticompetitive harm.
Big Data can lead to economies of scale via the alleged “feedback
loop.” In search, some argue, “the availability of data on previous search
queries is crucial” to competitive success.119 There are two ways the “feed116

Case COMP/M.6314, Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, Comm’n
Decision, 2012 O.J. (C 66) 122, ¶ 543 (noting that “[c]ustomers generally tend to give their personal
data to many market players, which gather and market it. Therefore, this type of data is generally understood to be a commodity.”). See also European Commission Press Release IP/12/938, Mergers: Commission Clears the Creation of a Mobile Commerce Joint Venture by UK Mobile Operators Telefónica,
Vodafone and Everything Everywhere (Sept. 5, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12938_en.htm (“The market investigation revealed that a number of alternatives already exist and much
more are very likely to emerge in the near future to ensure adequate competitive pressure on the joint
venture's mobile wallet platform. Some of these alternatives may rely on a secure access to the SIM card
of the mobile handsets in order to store sensitive data like bank account numbers, etc. This access will
be controlled by the mobile network operators, including in particular the three parents of the joint
venture. However, other alternatives exist which do not store sensitive data on SIM-cards and it is
unlikely that the creation of the joint venture will allow the parent mobile network operators to block
these alternative routes to market using technical or commercial means.”).
117 Case COMP/M.7023, Publicis/Omnicom, Comm’n Decision, 2014 O.J. (C 84) 122, ¶ 640. See
also Paul McGeown & Aude Barthelemy, Recent Developments in EU Merger Control 2014, 6 J. EURO.
COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 440, 445 (2015) (“One of the important factors given weight by the
Commission in deciding not to challenge the transaction was the ability of customers to cut out (or at
least threaten to cut out) intermediary agencies such as the parties and purchase directly from media
vendors. While the market investigation suggested that the proportion of direct purchases was relatively
small, a large majority of media owners replied that they do make direct sales and half of the customers
who replied to questionnaires said that they had in fact bought directly from media vendors in the preceding 3 years.”).
118 European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release EDPS/2014/06, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data (Mar. 26, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_EDPS-146_en.htm?locale=en (“The collection and control of massive amounts of personal data are a source of
market power for the biggest players in the global market for internet services.”).
119 Graef, supra note 78, at 10.
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back loop” can lead to greater economies of scale. The “user feedback
loop” theory presumes that as a platform gains more users it can collect
more user data, leading to better insights into consumers and their needs,
which the firm can use to improve quality and attract even more users.120
The “monetization feedback loop” theory claims that as a platform gains
more users and collects more user data, the firm is better able to target and
sell ads, and so is better able to monetize its platform and gain revenues that
can be invested in improving quality of service, thereby attracting more
users.121
Alongside these feedback loops, a number of distinct network effects
come into play in online platforms that collect and use Big Data. Direct
network effects occur when a product or service becomes more valuable to
an individual user as more people use that particular product or service,
such as in telecommunications networks or the electric grid. In a high tech
context, social networking platforms, photo sharing platforms, and chat
applications may enjoy significant direct network effects.122 Indirect network effects occur when more users make the use of a product or service
better or more attractive to consumers, though not because of direct interaction between users. Search engines benefit from indirect network effects as
more users allow the search engine to gain insight from user clicks into
what users want, essentially learning by trial and error, and therefore improving the quality of search results.123
Some argue that network effects are particularly strong in two-sided
platforms.124 A firm operating a two-sided platform can, it is argued, benefit
from not only from traditional network effects, but also from cross platform
network effects, where more users on one side of the platform makes the
platform more attractive to users on the other side of the market.125 While
entry barriers naturally vary from industry to industry, and indeed change
over time, these practitioners suggest that the economies of scale and network effects that characterize data-driven markets lead to a “winner takes
all” result, and present insurmountable barriers to entry.126
In reality, the strength of the feedback loop may be grossly overstated.
The feedback loop theory assumes smaller rivals and challengers will not
120

Lerner, supra note 16, at 19.
Id. at 39.
122 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–26 (1985) (discussing direct and indirect network effects).
123 Lerner, supra note 16, at 10–11.
124 Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2012)
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be able to compete effectively, as they lack comparable amounts of users,
and therefore data, which inhibits their ability to improve quality and attract
more users. As Lerner points out, however, these assumptions are “unsupported by real-world evidence.”127 The economic characteristics of Big Data
weaken the claimed strength of the feedback loop.128 Chief among these
characteristics is the fact that online providers can gain scale in users in
ways that do not involve user data, and that access to data alone is not
enough to improve quality and gain scale in users.129 Additionally, firms can
gather data from sources other than users (e.g. data brokers),130 and can gain
scale in data in alternative ways, such as by entering into strategic distribution arrangements.131 In one such partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo
regarding search results and advertising, the European Commission notes
that “it is plausible that the merged entity through innovation and through
its access to a larger index will be able to provide personalized search results better aligned to users' preferences.”132
As to network effects, even in classic cases of direct network effects
such as social networking and communications applications, innovation can
be strong enough to upend the market, and network effects have time and
time again proven insufficient to prevent newcomers from disrupting established market leaders. In social networking for example, Friendster, the
original “market leader” was replaced quickly by MySpace, which has now
been rendered almost completely obsolete by Facebook. An innovative
product is enough to cause users to switch, notwithstanding any network
effect enjoyed by the incumbent.
Among advertisers, network effects are diminished by the pricing
structures employed by most online platforms, by advertiser multi-homing
due to the low cost in advertising on multiple platforms, and by advertiser
“congestion.”133 The pay-per-click model means that while advertising on a
“busier” platform may result in better conversion rates for an advertiser, it
also involves proportionally higher costs, and more clicks means the advertiser has to pay more.134 As such, it may actually not be as economically
advantageous for an advertiser to choose a larger online platform over a
smaller one (contrary to real world platforms that are priced differently).135
Additionally, since fixed costs to advertise on any particular platform are
low, advertisers may be incentivized to advertise on multiple different plat127
128
129
130
131
132
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See Part II for a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of Big Data.
Lerner, supra note 16, at 28.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 28.
Case COMP/M.5727, Microsoft/Yahoo Search Business, Comm’n Decision, 2010 O.J. (C) 37,
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forms as opposed to putting all their eggs in one basket. Finally, while more
users on a platform might be good for advertisers, more advertisers on the
platform can actually be detrimental. Limited available space for online ads
and competition for users’ attention means that advertisers may be better
off on smaller platforms with less congestion.136
Perhaps most importantly, cross platform network effects are also
commonly overstated, and are actually one-sided. While advertisers certainly may flock to a search engine (or other online platform) with a strong
user base with the hope of gaining more impressions and hopefully more
conversions, users, on the other hand, do not choose a search engine based
on a greater number of advertisements. This weakening of the cross platform network effects argument in turn weakens the potential for a strong
“feedback loop that locks users and advertisers to a dominant platform.”137
If a smaller entrant offers a better product or service to users, users will
switch, uninhibited by network effects, and advertisers will soon follow.138
The above discussion demonstrates how the feedback loop is not as effective as suggested in gaining scale, but many commentators also misjudge
the importance of scale. Big Data industries typically experience diminishing returns of scale. Statistically, as Lerner illustrates, “the value of user
data in returning relevant results to user search queries is subject to diminishing returns,” as the “advantages of scale weaken or even disappear at a
low level.”139 While returns are greater for less frequent queries (known as
“tail” queries), both large and small search providers are faced with queries
they have never seen before on daily basis, where both small and large platforms are at an equal disadvantage in delivering relevant results.140 Because
of these rapidly diminishing returns, a larger provider may gain zero marginal value from incremental data after a certain point, and a smaller player
may glean greater value from incremental data, incentivizing it to compete
to attract users at the margin by investing in quality and innovation.141
Even if scale is crucial to competitive success, smaller rivals do maintain both the ability and the incentive to compete.142 As to ability, many
online players are well-funded, or at least have access to additional funding
from investors, which they can use to improve quality and performance of
their platform. Furthermore, all online players have access to stores of data
from third parties, which is readily available and affordable, and can be
deftly used to increase quality. As to incentive, economics tells us that investment incentive is based on marginal, not average effects. An investment
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 59.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 61.
Lerner, supra note 16, at 6, 36.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38.
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in quality by a smaller firm will attract more incremental users than a similar investment by a larger firm. As such, the smaller firm’s incentives to
invest in quality may actually be greater than those of its larger rival.
A final note on scale as a proxy for harm is articulated best by Lerner
when he cautions that
the mere existence of economies of scale does not, by itself, establish that large providers
have monopoly power, that large providers have acted anticompetitively, or that consumers
or competition have been harmed. Neither does the fact that there are economies of scale
means that large online providers should be subject to greater antitrust scrutiny . . . . Regulating large firms simply because there are economies of scale would serve as a tax on competi143
tive success, distorting competition and harming consumers.

IV. IS ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT THE RIGHT WAY TO REGULATE BIG
DATA?
In order to consider whether antitrust is the most appropriate institutional choice within which to explore, and potentially address, Big Data
concerns, one should consider how antitrust case law has treated Big Data
issues to date, how Big Data might fit within existing antitrust analysis
framework or remedies, what legal or practical dangers might result from
applying antitrust to Big Data, and whether an alternative framework is
better suited to these issues.
A.

Case Law Does Not Support the Contention that Big Data Is an Antitrust Problem

A thorough search of case law and agency actions reveals no case law
on Big Data, nor have the antitrust agency consents ever affirmatively concluded that consumer data constitutes a barrier to entry. While competition
agencies and courts have concluded that data-related entry barriers may
exist for the sale of data that cannot be sourced from consumers or big data
marketplaces, they have yet to come to the same conclusion regarding data
collected from consumers over the internet. Over the last five to ten years,
antitrust agencies, and to a lesser extent the courts, have considered a number of mergers and instances of conduct involving potential theories of
harm built around Big Data. One of the earliest examples of this was Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick in 2007.144 At the time, both parties were
large players in the market for search advertising—Google was a large on143

Id. at 20.
Michael Baye et al., Economics at the FTC: The Google-DoubleClick Merger, Resale Price
Maintenance, Mortgage Disclosures, and Credit Scoring in Auto Insurance, 33 REV. IND. ORG. 211,
213 (2008) (providing an economic analysis of the Google-DoubleClick merger).
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line advertising intermediary, and DoubleClick was a leading online ad
server. Both parties had vast stores of data relating to user search and
browsing history.
Both the FTC and the EC cleared the merger unconditionally, deciding
that Google and DoubleClick were not close, actual, or potential competitors in any markets for online advertising or services, and concluding that
an incumbent’s access to user information was not a barrier to entry in online advertising.145 Both authorities concluded that even if Google were to
use DoubleClick’s user data in targeting advertisements, the data at issue
was not an essential input to a successful online advertising product, and
similar data of similar scope and quantity were available to rivals from
other sources.146 The FTC stated that that the antitrust laws did not provide a
basis to block or impose conditions on a merger purely to safeguard privacy.147 The FTC further concluded that harm to competition on privacy
grounds was no more likely than harm to competition on price or other dimensions, and determined therefore that “privacy considerations, as such,
do not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.”148 As briefly discussed
earlier in this article, then Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour dissented
from the Commission’s statement, arguing that the FTC forewent an opportunity to examine the effects of the merger on privacy as a form on nonprice competition.149 The European Commission’s evaluation of the merger
focused solely on an analysis of competitive effects, and did not directly
address privacy concerns.150 The EC stressed that its decision was without
prejudice to the parties’ separate obligations under European data protection law.151
Subsequently, in 2011 Google acquired ITA, an online electronic pricing and shopping platform sold to comparison flight engines like Bing
Travel, Kayak, and Orbitz.152 The Department of Justice considered data
access as a potential vertical restraint in that case, and asked whether Google would gain the incentive and ability to engage in data driven exclusionary conduct that would foreclose its travel search rivals.153 Specifically, the
Department of Justice asked whether Google would be able to degrade or
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Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170, at 12
(Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220google
dc-commstmt.pdf [hereinafter FTC DoubleClick Statement].
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2.
148 Id.
149 Harbour Dissenting Statement, supra note 108, at 10 n. 25.
150 Case COMP/M.4731, Google/DoubleClick, Comm’n Decision, 2008 O.J. (C 927) 5, ¶ 2–3.
151 Id. at 97, ¶ 368.
152 Complaint at 2, ¶ 1, United States v. Google Inc, Case No. 1:11 cv-00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/complaint-115.
153 Id. at 12-13, ¶ 38.
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raise the cost of data, a necessarily input in its rivals’ platforms.154 Ultimately, these issues were resolved with a consent decree requiring Google
to continue licensing access to ITA’s system on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, and prohibiting Google from using consumer data for
its own benefit.155
Similarly, both the FTC and the European Commission examined
Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of web-based messaging platform WhatsApp.
Upon announcement of the transaction, several consumer groups complained to the FTC that the transaction would bolster Facebook’s access to
data which the company could monetize through advertising, contradicting
prior statements by WhatsApp.156 The FTC cleared the transaction within
two months, and sent a clear indication that the issues raised rested squarely
within consumer protection law by sending a letter to the parties from the
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection reminding them of their
continuing obligations under privacy law.157
The European Commission also reviewed the Facebook/WhatsApp
merger, and in doing so provided an analytical framework for exclusionary
behavior in Big Data industries, ultimately clearing the transaction without
conditions.158 While the Commission acknowledged that network effects
could sometimes pose a barrier to entry in communications markets, it concluded that this particular transaction was not likely to raise barriers to entry, noting “consumers can and do use multiple apps at the same time and
can easily switch from one to another,”159 and adding that “‘there are currently a significant number of market participants that collect user data
alongside Facebook,’ including Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft,
AOL, Yahoo, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp.”160
That investigation was significant, as it recognized the factual inexistence of network effects as a barrier to entry in such a fast moving online
market. The Commission based this conclusion on:
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Id. at 13.
Competitive Impact Statement at 13–14, Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688, http://www.justice.
gov/atr/cases/f269600/269620.pdf.
156 See Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, In re WhatsApp, Inc.
(F.T.C. Mar. 6, 2014) at 1, ¶ 1, http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/WhatsApp
%20Complaint.pdf.
157 Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Erin
Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook, Inc. & Anne Hoge, Gen. Counsel, WhatsApp Inc. (Apr. 10,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/297701/140410facebookwhatapp
ltr.pdf.
158 See Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 191 (Mar. 20, 2014).
159 European Commission Press Release IP/14/1088, Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition
of WhatsApp by Facebook (Oct. 3, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1088_en.pdf.
160 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 8 (quoting Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp,
Comm’n Decision, ¶ 188).
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(1) The finding that messaging apps were a “fast-moving sector” with
low switching costs, and therefore, “any leading market position even if
assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable;” 161
(2) The finding that usage of one particular messaging app did not “exclude the use of competing [messaging] apps by the same user;” in this context, multi-homing was common and facilitated by the “ease of downloading a consumer communications app;”162 and
(3) Acknowledgment that users of messaging apps “are not locked-in”
to a given network.163
The Commission found that even if Facebook were to begin collecting
data from WhatsApp users, competitive harm would not result, as “there
will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that are valuable for
advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook’s exclusive control.”164 The Commission’s decision also explicitly rejected the idea of considering a potential market for personal data in this case, citing the fact that
the parties were not actually engaged in the sale of data to third parties.165
In the US, there was a similar outcome with regard to the Nielsen/Arbitron merger,166 where the data was merely an input and the data
itself was not for sale.167 Such cases where data is merely an input are different from cases where data is a market that firms sell to consumers.168
Outside the merger context, the Federal Trade Commission’s 20112012 investigation of Google centered at least partially on the competitive
significance of data.169 In a recent statement responding to the inadvertently
released of portions of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition Staff Report,
Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioners Brill and Ohlhausen noted that
the Commission’s “exhaustive” investigation into Google’s internet search
practices, including agreements for syndicated search and advertising services were not, “on balance, demonstrably anticompetitive.”170
161

Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 132 (Mar. 20, 2014).
Id. at 24, ¶ 133.
163 Id. at 24, ¶ 134.
164 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 8 (quoting Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp,
Comm’n Decision, ¶ 189 (Mar. 10, 2014)).
165 Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, ¶ 72 (Mar. 10, 2014).
166 In re Nielsen Holdings N.V. & Arbitron Inc., No. C-4439 (F.T.C. Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140228nielsenholdingsdo.pdf.
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(2013).
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Big Data as Its Own Product Market

Antitrust enforcement is also not suited to regulating Big Data due to
the difficulty inherent in defining the relevant market for data. Market definition and market power still form the backbone of antitrust analysis under
the current law. Some practitioners have suggested that data collection
should form its own product market for the purpose of antitrust analysis.171
The precise contours of such a market would be difficult, if not impossible,
to define.
In both the U.S. and Europe, substitution, via the hypothetical monopolist test, is an essential prerequisite to defining a market.172 The primary goal of defining a market is to measure a firm’s ability to exercise
market power. The relevant market determines which goods or services
potentially compete, to the exclusion of those that do not.173 Applying this
determination to the advertising industry, we see that data itself is not a
relevant product in the sale of online advertising. Advertising services are
the relevant product. For the most part, online providers use data as an input
in their service, as opposed to selling it as a product to consumers.174 There
is, therefore, no competition between providers for the actual sale of data,
and no substitution. As such, under current antitrust law, no relevant market
can be defined for the collection of consumer data.175
This was illustrated in the European Commission’s review of the
Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition, where the Commission overtly declined
to define a market for Big Data since neither party was active in the provision of data to third parties.176 The Commission explained that it “has not
investigated any possible market definition with respect to the provision of
data or data analytics services, since . . . neither of the Parties is currently
active in any such potential markets.”177 Graef points out, however, that the
171 European Parliament, Competition & Privacy in Markets of Data, Speech by Pamela Jones
Harbour, former Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Nov. 2012), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
files/us/images/publications/121127PJHarbourEUParliamentCompetitionPrivacy.pdf
(“Defining
a
market for user data may . . . better reflect how firms, their competitors, their customers, and their users
interact in the real world . . . . Defining a product market for user data may affect the structure and scope
of a regulator’s investigations.”); Harbour & Koslov, supra note 94, 773.
172 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 4.
173 Id. at 4–5.
174 Note however that data can be collected for sale directly to advertisers or data brokers for
repackaging. See, e.g. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, at ii (May 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokerscalltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527
databrokerreport.pdf. For example, Twitter licenses data to other companies interested in developing
applications or analyzing data for other commercial purposes. See Graef, supra note 78, at 5, 15.
175 Graef, supra note 78, at 16–17.
176 Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶¶ 70–71 (Mar. 10, 2014).
177 Id. at ¶ 72.
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Commission’s rejection of personal data as a relevant market did not preclude a review of concerns raised relating to the concentration of data as a
result of this merger.178
C.

Consumer Protection Should Address Big Data Issues

The laws of consumer protection and antitrust serve different goals,
protect consumers from different harms, and operate via different spheres
of the same agency.179 As Deborah Feinstein, head of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission explains, “any potential competition
concerns would be distinct from the obligations either firm has to safeguard
consumer privacy.”180 A recent review of the economics of privacy illustrates the complexity inherent in regulating privacy issues, but this review
does not find a theoretical or empirical bases for using antitrust as a policy
tool to address privacy concerns.181
There have been a number of different suggested approaches for how
and when antitrust regulators should intervene in Big Data or privacy issues.182 One group advocates for a hybrid approach to policing Big Data,
where the costs and benefits of consumer protection are balanced against
the effect on competition where “conduct-distorting commerce implicates
both consumer protection and competition principles.”183 In support of this
approach, Harbour and Koslov have described the separation of competition
and consumer protection as an “artificial dichotomy.”184
Others suggest that because privacy protections constitute a form of
non-price competition, regulators should apply antitrust principles to analyze privacy issues in a variety of different circumstances, such as when a
merger might lead to reduced privacy competition,185 or where companies
may mislead customers regarding data collection policies in order to gain
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Description (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/09/big-data-toolinclusion-or-exclusion (discussing the issues around Big Data).
180 Feinstein, supra note 22.
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an unfair advantage or sustain dominance over competitors.186 However,
other product elements such as product safety and efficacy also constitute
forms of non-price competition, but are not primarily policed by the antitrust agencies. As Schepp and Wamback opine, “The most direct way to
address worries about data protection and privacy is actually to tighten data
protection law.”187 In this sense, institutional choice plays a role in how best
to address a particular problem, and the optimal solution is to choose the
institution best suited for this task.188 The antitrust laws’ only task is to
maintain an environment within which products may compete, with the
understanding that, as Ohlhausen and Okuliar put it, “competition is the
best way to allocate resources in a free market.”189 The antitrust laws are not
designed to address harms to privacy, but an efficient market, bolstered by
the consumer protection laws, would provide adequate protection from
those harms, with each legal area (antitrust and consumer protection) using
their distinct institutional competencies to promote increased consumer
welfare.
Consumer protection is an effective way to address issues of privacy.190 There are a number of existing methods that govern how the FTC
regulates privacy on the consumer protection side and does so relatively
effectively.191 Suggested safeguards intended to prevent the misuse of Big
Data by a dominant firm, such as enabling the consumer to more easily
select privacy preferences or to identify providers that match their privacy
preferences, sit squarely within the remit of the consumer protection agencies.192 Where an “imbalance of power” between users and online firms
leads to diminished data portability, individual consumers or competitors
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See Ron Knox, An Interview with Tom Rosch, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. 51 (2013). See
generally J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Concurring and Dissenting Statement
Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2012),
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187 Schepp & Wambach, supra note 63, at 124.
188 See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1055, 1140–41 (2010).
189 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 142.
190 Edith Ramirez et al., Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding the Issues, in
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GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2230 (2015) (“[T]he FTC’s current scope of data protection authority is
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192 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 72, at 13–14.

1158

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 23:5

might suffer,193 but the mechanics of data collection is not for the antitrust
laws to govern. Antitrust law is only a suitable choice where there is harm
to competition— its role is not to fill gaps in the privacy laws.
In its decision clearing the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the European
Commission also underscored the importance of appropriate institutional
choice in addressing the harms explored in this article, noting, “Any privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data
within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall
within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the
EU data protection rules.”194
1.

Are Antitrust Remedies Appropriate?

Some have suggested that antitrust remedies may be appropriate where
a dominant firm has misused Big Data to gain or sustain an improper competitive advantage.195 The imposition of such remedies presents obvious
problems. From an antitrust perspective, forced sharing of information with
rivals infers the essential facilities doctrine,196 and such forced dealing with
competitors in the Big Data environment is far beyond the limits of what a
duty to deal would require,197 and may improperly skew competitive incentives. As Tucker and Wellford, quoting the Supreme Court in Trinko,198
remind us, compelling firms “to share the source of their advantage is in
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may
lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities.”199 If Big Data were deemed an essential
193

Id. at 12–13.
Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 164 (Mar. 10, 2014).
195 See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 72, at 9–10.
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197 See Barak Orbach & Raphael Avraham, Squeeze Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECON. 120, 121
(Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014).
198 Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
199 Id. at 407–08.
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facility and a duty to deal imposed, the competitive dynamics of the market
would be dramatically altered.200 Such an extreme and far-reaching remedy
is out of line with current antitrust policy.201
Practically speaking, requiring affirmative user consent before data is
collected may detract from the user experience and lessen quality. Similarly, prohibiting or restricting data collection may stifle innovation and
present users with lower quality services; and divestiture or separation of
distinct product lines may also stifle innovation and hinder a firm’s ability
to offer personalized services.202
Antitrust remedies haphazardly applied to the collection and use of
consumer data may not only harm competition, but also may in fact raise
separate, legitimate, privacy issues.203 Antitrust remedies may also create
privacy concerns, as they would require data to be shared among rival firms
even though consumers have not consented to their data being used in this
way.204 Likewise, a forced sharing of data could violate a company’s already existing consent decrees with the FTC.205
The FTC, in the Closing Statement from its investigation into the
Google/DoubleClick merger, rejected the notion that antitrust remedies
should be imposed to address privacy harms:
[T]he sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and
remedy transactions that harm competition. Not only does the Commission lack legal authority to require conditions to this merger that do not relate to antitrust, regulating the privacy
requirements of just one company could itself pose a serious detriment to competition in this
206
vast and rapidly evolving industry.

Difficulty in administering such remedies also counsels against their application. Informing consumers of the intricate details of data collection can
200 See Mark A. Jamison, Should Google be Regulated as a Public Utility?, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
223, 224 (2013); Mattiuzzo, supra note 79, at 5.
201 Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 275, 319 (2013) (“In an effort to find an antitrust basis to prohibit [Google’s] practice,
some have invoked the essential facilities doctrine or the more general antitrust duty to deal. However,
these two principles simply do not fit in the context of search results. Google's absolute size and involvement in many segments of the information market tend to obscure the fact that it probably lacks
monopoly power in an antitrust sense. It is doubtful that Google can foreclose competition in search, let
alone in the dynamic and free-form information market in which it faces competitors such as Facebook,
Apple, Amazon, and others. If the past is any guide, competitive challenge could also come from some
as yet unknown tech visionary—a future Steve Jobs, Larry Page, Sergei Brin, or Mark Zuckerberg.”);
Orbach & Avraham, supra note 197, at 129–30.
202 Ohlhausen and Okuliar, supra note 4, at 151; Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 10.
203 See generally Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, in INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 65–90 (Josh Lerner and Scott Stern eds., 2012).
204 Id.
205 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 11.
206 FTC DoubleClick Statement, supra note 145, at 2.
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actually be misleading to consumers, and result in more confusion.207 Firms
may legitimately be unable to adequately inform a consumer at the outset of
how exactly the firm will use their data.208 As with all remedies, the agencies and the courts will not, and should not, want to become too involved in
specifically shaping the minutiae of a firm’s data sharing policies, which
presents even further administrative issues.209
2.

Practical and Legal Dangers of Antitrust Intervention

Using antitrust as a sword to address Big Data concerns risks reducing
competition and innovation from new products.210 Antitrust enforcement
agencies are well advised to proceed cautiously in areas of rapid innovation,
in order to avoid stifling competition and the natural unfolding of the marketplace. As Lerner puts it, “Antitrust intervention in markets characterized
by innovation and rapid technological change is often a questionable proposition, but it is especially so when concerns are based on supported assumptions rather than fact-based inquiry.”211 While an industry is in its relative
infancy, it can be difficult to distinguish between procompetitive innovation
and changes that are designed to (or actually do) stifle competition. Even in
established markets, antitrust should never be used as a replacement for
sound business judgment. As the FTC’s closing statement in the Google
investigation explained, “Challenging Google’s product design decisions in
this case would require the Commission—or a court—to second-guess a
firm’s product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by
ample evidence.”212
Consumer welfare is enhanced most dramatically by “leapfrog” competition, as opposed to incremental improvements. It is crucial that the antitrust laws cultivate and maintain an environment in which robust and rapid
innovation is not only possible, but also incentivized. A paternalistic approach to Big Data will neither cultivate nor maintain such an environment,
and may instead lead to stagnation and fear among platform providers.
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CONCLUSION
This literature review suggests that antitrust law is ill-suited to police
Big Data and its use by online firms. The empirical case for regulating Big
Data as an antitrust concern is still lacking.213 Further, from a theoretical
perspective, not enough work has yet been done to thoughtfully study and
analyze how antitrust could, or should, be applied to specific issues involving Big Data. In fact, the lack of empirical evidence, robust theories, or,
indeed, legal precedent suggests that there is no cause for concern in this
arena with regard to antitrust law and Big Data. All that is available at present are general theories of exclusion applied to this new area. Until antitrust authorities can match theories of harm with specific factual circumstances and show negative competitive harm to consumers, the antitrust
case against Big Data is a weak one. The existing theories of harm conflict
with the realities of Big Data (e.g., non-rivalrous, ubiquitous, low barriers
to entry noted above) and consumer online behavior (e.g., multi-homing).214
And while the case is weak, and the theories uncertain, antitrust authorities
should proceed with caution. Antitrust intervention over market forces
threatens consumer welfare, especially is fast moving markets, and proposed remedies, such as limiting the collection and use of Big Data or forcing large firms to share with rivals, are likely to harm competition and innovation, and in fact may raise privacy concerns.
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